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INDIAN TRIBAL TRUST FUNDS
"The duty of a trustee plainly is, even if he is the trustee of
an Indian, to do the best he can for the benefit of his bene-
ficiary."'
Introduction
The United States government has long managed most Indian trib-
al money. Frequently, however, the government's failure to make
sound investment decisions has resulted in substantial losses to the
tribes. Such losses have been difficult to redress, for there is still un-
certainty concerning the standard of care to which the government must
be held in managing these funds. Although the courts have borrowed
terms from trust law in characterizing the government's position, its re-
sponsibilities have never been clearly delineated. Attempts by Indian
tribes to clarify the relationship through litigation have been hindered
by the fact that access to the courts was almost impossible before 1946.
Although access has improved since then, it is still in the main provided
by the Indian Claims Commission and the Court of Claims, both lo-
cated in Washington, D.C., both distrusted and criticized by the tribes,
and neither really serving as an effective forum for complaints of
breach of trust.
Nonetheless, two alternative solutions to the problem of defining
the government's responsibility in managing Indian funds have recently
been proposed, one by a United States district court and one by the
Indian Claims Commission. In Manchester Band of Pomo Indians, Inc.
v. United States,2 a federal district court in California held that the
duties of the government as trustee of Indian funds must be measured
by private trust law principles. Two months later, the Indian Claims
Commission in Te-Moak Bands of Western Shoshone Indians v. United
States3 concluded that the government as trustee of tribal funds fulfills
its fiduciary duty merely by complying with statutes governing the
management of Indian money, even though the rate of interest pro-
vided by statute is as low as 4 percent per annum.
1. 10 CONG. REc. 214 (1880) (remarks of Senator Edmunds).
2. 363 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
3. 31 Ind. C1. Comm. 427 (1973), reh. denied, 33 Ind. C1. Comm. 417 (1974),
rev'd in pertinent part sub nom. United States v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 518 F.2d
1309 (Ct. C1. 1975).
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Manchester Band and Te-Moak thus represent conflicting ap-
proaches to the question of what duties attach to the government-tribal
relationship. Although the court in Te-Moak afforded less protection
for tribes whose money is held by the government,4 both decisions
recognize that the government must be held to a high standard of care
in dealing with Indian funds. This note will argue first, that the term
"trustee" best characterizes the government's role as manager of tribal
funds; second, that common law trust principles most accurately define
the basic obligations arising from a fiduciary relationship and most ef-
fectively enable a trustee, even the United States government, to guide
his investments prudently; and third, that since accounting claims and
suits for breach of fiduciary duty involve both legal and equitable reme-
dies they are best handled by the federal district courts which have
more expertise in applying trust law than does the Court of Claims or
the Indian Claims Commission.
Trust Obligations
Before attempting to determine whether traditional trust law prin-
ciples should be applied to the management of Indian tribal funds, it
is necessary to determine what consequences such a determination
would have. A trustee, when he assumes management of a trust, as-
sumes certain basic duties. Perhaps the most important of these is the
duty of loyalty: the duty "to administer the trust solely in the interest
of the beneficiary."5  Thus, a trustee is accountable, even in the ab-
sence of a breach of trust, for any profits made by him because of his
administration of the trust.6 A second basic duty is to make the trust
property productive:
7
In the case of money, it is normally the duty of the trustee to invest
it so that it will produce an income. The trustee is liable if he fails
4. The Court of Claims reversed the Indian Claims Commission decision in Te-
Moak as this note was in its final stages of preparation for publication. Since the note
was not yet in galley form, I have been able to make some additions to the text where
necessary to call the reader's attention to the fact of the reversal. For a detailed
discussion of both the majority and the dissenting opinions, see notes 77-94 & accompa-
nying text infra. I have not cut the discussion of the Indian Claims Commission's
opinion in the text because the Supreme Court will eventually consider the issues raised
by Te-Moak and Manchester Band, perhaps by certiorari review of the Court of Claims
decision in Te-Moak.
5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 (1959) (emphasis added); see G.G.
BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 543, at 473-82 (2d ed.
1960) [hereinafter cited as BOGERT].
6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 203 (1959).
7. Id. § 181; see BOGERT, supra note 5, § 611.
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to invest trust funds . . . for a period which is under all the cir-
cumstances unreasonably long.8
Third, a trustee is subject to the "prudent man rule": in managing
the trust res he must exercise the degree of care, skill, and prudence
which would be exercised by a reasonably prudent person in managing
his own property.9 If the trustee has greater or special skill, he will
be held to a higher standard.' 0 Further, so that the beneficiary can
be apprised of actions taken with regard to the trust, the trustee is un-
der duties to keep and render accounts"- and to furnish information
at the beneficiary's request. 2
Sources of Trust Funds
The failure of the government to make tribal money productive
has been the primary flaw in the government's management of Indian
funds. Until approximately 1966,'13 most Indian money was kept in
accounts in the United States Treasury. Many of these accounts paid
no interest at all; in no case did any account pay more than 5 percent
interest. Since 1966, some of the tribal money has been taken from
the Treasury and deposited in local banks.' 4 As a result of these in-
vestment practices, one tribe's money may be split into several ac-
counts, with a dramatic loss of interest income to the Indian tribes.
The amount of money involved is not insignificant: the sum held in
trust has grown from 35 million dollars in 19041 to 300 million dollars
in fiscal 1973.16 By 1967, approximately one-half of this amount was
deposited in banks,' 7 presumably at pevailing rates of interest. The
8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 181, comment c (1959); see BOGERT,
supra note 5, § 702 (1959).
9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 174 (1959).
10. Id.
11. Id. § 172.
12. Id. § 173.
13. The Comptroller General reported to Congress in 1966 that "[ulninvested
cash deposited with the Treasury ranged from $11.1 million to $22.6 million during fiscal
year 1964, and a substantial portion of these funds appeared to be in excess of current
requirements." COMPTROLLER GENERAL, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED
STATES, NEED FOR IMPROVEMENTS IN THE MANAGEMENT OF MONEYS HELD IN TRUST FOR
INDIANS 4 (March, 1966).
14. A. SORKIN, AMERICAN INDIANS AND FEDERAL Am 139 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as SoRuN].
15. 1 INDIAN AFFAIRS LAWS AND TREATIES 1022 (Kappler ed. 1904).
16. UNITED STATES TREASURY DEP'T, CoMiBINED STATEMENT OF REcEIPTs, EXPEN-
DrrURES AND BALANCES OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FOR THE FISCAL YEAR
ENDED JUNE 30, 1973, at 336.
17. SORKIN, supra note 14, at 137, 203, Table A-16.
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other half, deposited in the Treasury, included 4.3 million dollars kept
in so-called interest accounts, which earn no interest."5
The tribal money which is kept in the Treasury accounts has
come from four basic sources. The earliest tribal funds derived from
treaty commitments. Although the oldest treaties often provided for
distribution of goods,19 sometimes on an annual basis,2" the govern-
ment eventually began to pay annuities to the tribe as a whole,2 ' to the
men who had signed the treaty, or to those who agreed to settle on
homesteads or to accept allotments of land.22 The funds created by
treaty were usually either payments to tribes for land cessions, con-
sideration for purchase of tracts of land, or compensation deposited in
the Treasury after land had been seized."
The second type of Treasury fund consists of earnings from the
use of tribal land, particularly from leases of grazing fights, timber
rights, and oil, gas, and other mineral rights. 4
Judgments from the Indian Claims Commission and the Court of
Claims comprise a third source of tribal funds.2 5 When a judgment is
18. See id. at 139.
19. See, e.g., Treaty with the Creeks, Aug. 7, 1790, 7 Stat. 35, art. XII ("the
United States will from time to time furnish gratuitously the said nation with useful
domestic animals and implements of husbandry.")
20. See, e.g., Treaty with the Delawares, June 7, 1803, 7 Stat. 74, art. III (150
bushels of salt per year in exchange for cession of large salt spring and 4 square miles
surrounding it); Treaty with the Wyandots, Aug. 3, 1795, 7 Stat. 49, art. IV (goods
worth $20,000 at the time the treaty was signed and yearly forever "like and usefull
goods, suited to the circumstances of the Indians," worth $9,500); Treaty with the
Cherokee, June 26, 1794, 7 Stat. 43, art. III ("goods suitable for their use, to the amount
of five thousand dollars yearly").
21. See, e.g., Treaty with the Potawatomie, Oct. 2, 1818, 7 Stat. 185, art. III
(perpetual annuity of $2,500 in silver); Treaty with the Choctaw, Oct. 24, 1816, 7 Stat.
152, art. II ($6,000 annually for 20 years).
22. See Te-Moak Bands of Western Shoshone Indians v. United States, 31 Ind. Cl.
Comm. 427, 431 (1973); F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 167 (1941)
[hereinafter cited as COHEN].
23. See SORKIN, supra note 14, at 137.
24. Id. It has been settled since 1823 that the Indians have a right of occupancy in
their land, but not a right to dispose of it at will. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8
Wheat.) 543 (1823). It was not until 1938 that this possessory interest was held to
encompass beneficial ownership of the natural resources on and below the land. United
States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. 111 (1938) (minerals and timber); United States v.
Klamath & Moadoc Tribes, 304 U.S. 119 (1938) (timber). Indian land tenure has been
treated exhaustively elsewhere. See generally COHEN, supra note 22, at 287-336; V.
DELORIA, JR., BEHIND THE TRIAL OF BROKEN TREATIES 85-111 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as DELORIA]; Cohen, Original Indian Title, 32 MINN. L. REV. 28 (1947); Gilbert &
Taylor, Indian Land Questions, 8 ARIZ. L. REV. 102 (1966).
25. See notes 122-44 & accompanying text infra.
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rendered against the United States, one portion is typically distributed
to tribal members per capita (a much criticized practice), 6 while the
remainder is deposited in the Treasury.
27
The last major category of tribal funds kept in the Treasury is a
catch-all. It consists of funds containing "[a]ll miscellaneous revenues
derived from Indian reservations . . . and not the result of the labor
of any member of such tribe .... -28 This fund is inaccurately
named Indian Moneys, Proceeds of Labor (IMIPL). At the time of
the decision in Te-Moak, IMPL funds were kept in the Treasury at
4 percent simple interest per annum.
In addition to the four Treasury accounts, there is a fifth type of
tribal account, which is typically deposited in local banks. These are
the Individual Indian Money (IIM) accounts, managed by the Bureau
of Indian Affairs (BIA) area office nearest the tribe.
29
A tribe may have a number of funds which fall within each of
the five categories described above, and which earn varying rates of
interest. For example, in Menominee Tribe v. United States,30 the
court discussed eight funds kept in the Treasury for the Menominees:
"Menominee Fund" (5%); "Interest on Menominee Fund"; "Ful-
filling Treaties with Menominees, Logs" (4%); "Interest on Fulfilling
Treaties with Menominees, Logs"; "Menominee Log Fund" (5%);
"Interest on Menominee Log Fund"; "Menominee 4% Fund" (an
IMPL fund); and "Interest on Menominee 4% Fund.' This pro-
liferation of funds is in no way unusual; it results from a classification
system which separates funds according to their sources, rather than
demand the clear delineation of the relationship between the govern-
by any logical scheme.
Development of the Trust Relationship
The steady increase in the amount of money held in trust for the
Indians and the wide variety of accounts and interest rates available
demand the clear delineation of the relationship between the govern-
26. See, e.g., SORKwn, supra note 14, at 145-46.
27. Id. at 137-38.
28. 25 U.S.C. § 155 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of March 3, 1883, ch. 141,
§ 1, 22 Stat. 590) (emphasis added).
29. "Individual Indian Moneys" is also a misnomer, because IIM accounts also
contain deposits by tribal groups. See 25 C.F.R. §§ 104.1, 105.1, 105.9 (1975). Although
individuals may withdraw money from the accounts, the fund itself is an aggregate; when
it is deposited in a bank, the account is opened in the name of the BIA disbursing agent;
see SOMR N, supra note 14, at 151-56.
30. 101 Ct. C1. 10 (1944).
31. Id. (passim).
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ment and the Indian tribes, 2 particularly with respect to the govern-
ment's role as manager of Indian funds.
That some type of special relationship exists between the Indian
tribes and the government had been reiterated from the time of the
early treaties3 3 until the present.3 4  Unfortunately, terms used to de-
scribe the relationship, such as "guardian and ward," "incompetent,"
and "trustee," have been used inconsistently and imprecisely in statutes
and opinions.35 For example, although Indians have frequently been
referred to as "wards" of the United States government,36 the noted
Indian law scholar, Felix Cohen, factored out ten discrete connotations
of the term as used in Indian law.37  In fact, the guardian-ward rela-
32. Until very recently there was no scholarly work focusing in depth on the legal
relationship between the United States and the American Indians, much less on the
enforceability of trust duties against the government. This hiatus has been most ably
filled by Professor Reid Peyton Chambers of the University of California at Los
Angeles, an associate solicitor on leave from the Department of the Interior. His article
will be an invaluable source for Indian law scholars. Chambers, Judicial Enfoiccment of
the Federal Trust Responsibility to Indians, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1213 (1975) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Chambers]. Chambers's analysis of the origin and development of the trust
relationship and its applicability to Congress and the Executive is more complete than
the limited treatment necessitated by this note's focus on trust funds only. See id. at
1215-34.
33. "[Y]ou will perceive, by the law of Congress for regulating trade and
intercourse with the Indian tribes, the fatherly care the United States intend to take of
the Indians." President George Washington, quoted in Seneca Nation v. United States
173 Ct. Cl. 912, 924 (1965) (emphasis omitted).
34. "JjT]he special relationship between the Indian tribes and the Federal govern-
ment. . . continues to carry immense moral and legal force." 6 WEEKLY COMPILATIONS
OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 895 (message to Congress by President Richard M. Nixon,
July 13, 1970). Congress recently passed a law establishing the American Indian Policy
Review Commission. Act of Jan. 1, 1975, Pub. L. 93-580 §§ 1-7, 88 Stat. 1910. The
commission has been granted broad investigative powers and has been directed to set up
task forces to make studies of particular areas. Id. §§ 3-4. The first area of concern
stated in the act is the "trust responsibility and Federal-Indian relationship, including
treaty review." Id. § 4(a)(1). The commission must present a report to Congress and is
scheduled to be dissolved six months after the presentation of the report or by June 30,
1977. Id. § 5(a).
35. "Incompetent," for example, may refer to a Native American in full possession
of his mental faculties who holds a trust patent or restricted fee preventing him from
alienating his land without prior approval of the Secretary of the Interior. Felix Cohen
pointed out that "Charles Curtis, who, though he became Senator and Vice President of
the United States, remained all his life an incompetent Indian. ... COHEN, supra note
22, at 167.
36. "These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation. They are communities
dependent on the United States. Dependent largely for their daily food. Dependent for
their political rights." United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383-84 (1886).
37. (1) "wards as domestic dependent nations;" (2) "wards as tribes subject to
congressional power;" (3) "wards as individuals subject to congressional power;" (4)
"wards as subjects of federal court jurisdiction;" (5) "wards as subjects of administrative
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tionship has been used as often to justify the government's actions in
taking away Indian land and money as it has been invoked for the pro-
tection of the tribesY
Certainly the most famous judicial articulation of the special rela-
tionship between the United States government and the Indian tribes
was that of John Marshall in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia." With
characteristic legerdemain Marshall, while refusing to allow the Chero-
kees into court, still had a great deal to say on the general legal status
of Indian tribes. He determined that the Cherokee Nation could not
bring suit as a foreign nation against the State of Georgia, because
tribes within the boundaries of the United States are not foreign na-
tions, but "domestic dependent nations . . . in a state of pupilage.
Their relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his guard-
ian."40 Marshall's concept of the Indians as a simple untutored peo-
ple in need of protection proved a popular one with the Court, which
continued to describe their status in paternalistic and ambiguous
phrases until the twentieth century.41
In the 1930's the Court began to describe the special relationship
more precisely. Perhaps because the issue arose in cases dealing with
the handling of tribal money and property, the Court also began to rely
for the first time on analogies from trust law. In United States v.
Creek Nation,42 the Court required that the government pay compensa-
tion for having improperly disposed of Creek tribal property. Because
power" (the BIA); (6) "wards as noncitizens;" (7) wards as allottees holding land
subject to restrictions on alienation; (8) "wardship and inequality of bargaining power;"
(9) "wards as subjects of federal bounty;" and (10) "wards as beneficiaries of a trust."
COHEN, supra note 22, at 169-73.
38. 'The history of litigation in the field of Indian law indicates that the United
States claims its guardianship primarily when it is beneficial to its interests
DELORIA, supra note 24, at 159; see CoHEN, supra note 22, at 171.
The term "trust relationship" will be used in this note to refer to that legal
relationship which exists when the government either has legal title or holds real or
personal property for the use of an individual or a tribe. The term "special relationship"
will be used in all other instances. For a treatment of the fiduciary relationship which
arises when the government holds a trust patent for an individual tribal member see
Note, A Remedy for a Breach of the Government-Indian Trust Duties, 1 N.M.L. REv.
321 (1971).
39. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
40. Id. at 17; cf. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). See also
Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics and Morality, 21 STAN. L. REV.
500 (1969); Chambers, supra note 32, at 1217-23.
41. See, e.g., Choctaw Nation v. United States, 119 U.S. 1 (1886). "The recog-
nized relation between the parties to this controversy ... is that between a superior and
an inferior, whereby the latter is placed under the care and control of the former ....
Id. at 28.
42. 295 U.S. 103 (1935).
November 19751
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
it concluded that the United States stood in a fiduciary relationship to
the tribe, the Court imposed liability even though the assignment of
land resulted from an erroneous survey which was made in good faith.43
In 1942 in Seminole Nation v. United States" the Court began
explicitly to rely on trust law standards. The fiduciary in Seminole Na-
tion was the Seminole General Council, which had earned a measure
of notoriety for ensuring that money which came into its hands for dis-
tribution to members of the tribe never reached its rightful owners.
The Court, reasoning that the council stood in a fiduciary capacity to
the members of the nation, applied the rule that a third party paying
money to a fiduciary whom he knows to be false to his trust becomes
a participant in the resultant breach and liable to the beneficiary.45
The case was remanded to the Court of Claims for a determination
whether the government knew the council was corrupt when it paid
$66,000 to the council for disbursement. As to the government's obli-
gations to the nation, the Court said:
[I]t has charged itself with moral obligations of the highest respon-
sibility and trust. Its conduct, as disclosed in the acts of those who
represent it in dealings with the Indians, should therefore be judged
by the most exacting fiduciary standards.
46
In 1944, in Menominee Tribe v. United States,47 the government
was not a third party but was the primary fiduciary, and the issue con-
cerned mismanagement of Menominee tribal funds. As the case was
brought in the court of claims prior to the enactment of the 1946 In-
dian Claims Commission Act."' Congress had to pass a special jurisdic-
tional act waiving sovereign immunity and specifying the type of relief
to be granted.49 This special act instructed the court to "apply as re-
spects the United States the same principles of law as would be applied
to an ordinary fiduciary . . . ."" Applying this standard, the court
found "wrongful handling" in the Secretary of the Interior's spending
of money from interest-bearing tribal funds before using equally avail-
able non-interest-bearing funds."
43. Id. at 109-10; cf. Mott v. United States, 283 U.S. 747, 750 (1931) (govern-
ment can sue on behalf of Indian ward to regain money even though trust fund was
wrongfully depleted by government employee charged with its administration).
44. 316 U.S. 286 (1942).
45. Id. at 296, citing RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 321 (1935).
46. Id. at 297.
47. 101 Ct. Cl. 10 (1944).
48. See note 58 infra.
49. See note 58 infra.
50. 101 Ct. Cl. at 18. The court stated that the mandate of the jurisdictional act
adds "little to the settled doctrine that the United States, as regards its dealings with the
property of the Indians, is a trustee." Id. at 19.
51. Id. at 20.
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In addition, the court was greatly concerned by the fact that Con-
gress had authorized the Secretary of the Interior to deposit the various
trust funds in the Treasury instead of investing the money in bonds:
The Government, instead of investing the money, which it collected
for the Indians, in the bonds of other obligors, as an ordinary trus-
tee would have been required to do, authorized itself by statute to
put the money into its own treasury, in effect to borrow the money
from the Indians, giving them its promise to pay interest on some
of the funds. A private trustee who borrowed the -trust money for
his own use would, by that conduct, be guilty of a breach of trust.
5 2
Since the tribe had not challenged the propriety of the govern-
ment's keeping the money in the Treasury, however, the court reached
only the narrow issue of which funds should have been depleted first.
In reviewing the statutes, including the IMPL act,53 which had au-
thorized deposit of the Menominee's funds in the Treasury, the court
pointed out that the Secretary of the Interior, "under a duty to act
in harmony with the Government's position as a fiduciary" was not lim-
ited in his duty by the statutes under which he acted. 54
Recent federal court and court of claims decisions regarding man-
agement of tribal trust property have relied on the above cases in apply-
ing fiduciary standards to the government.56 The management of tri-
bal money, however, has rarely been litigated since Menominee Tribe.
The forbidding array of statutes which regulate trust funds and the in-
52. Id. See also Menominee Tribe v. United States, 67 F. Supp. 972, 975 (Ct. Cl.
1946) (defendant must deposit revenues in the Treasury within 30 days of receipt to
fulfill "that fidelity which a fiduciary owes his cestui"); Menominee Tribe v. United
States, 59 F. Supp. 137, 150 (Ct. Cl. 1945) (defendant's withdrawing money from a 5%
fund to operate plaintiff's business and then depositing the withdrawn money into a 4%
fund violated its fiduciary obligations).
53. See note 28 & accompanying text supra.
54. 101 Ct. Cl. at 21.
55. See, e.g., Manchester Band of Porno Indians, Inc. v. United States, 363 F.
Supp. 1238, 1243, 1246 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (mismanagement of tribal trust funds);
Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252, 256 (D.D.C. 1972) (improper
diversion of water from tribal lake); Navajo Tribe v. United States, 364 F.2d 320, 324
(Ct. Cl. 1966) (mismanagement of oil and gas leases); United States v. Seminole
Nation, 137 F. Supp. 784, 789-90 (Ct. Cl. 1959) (improper land sale); Menominee
Tribe v. United States, 101 Ct. Cl. 22, 39-40 (1944) (mismanagement of timber). But
cf. Oneida Tribe of Indians of Wisconsin v. United States, 165 Ct. Cl. 487, 493-94, 498,
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 946 (1964) (special relationship does not extend to duty to
preserve timber from depredation by tribal members).
In his discussion of Seminole Nation and Menominee Tribe, Chambers cautions that
"[these two cases could be viewed narrowly as simply stating implied principles found
in the special statutes conferring jurisdiction on the Court of Claims, and may thus not
state principles of general law .... Chambers, supra note 32, at 1232. It is possible
for a court of general jurisdiction to fasten on this point, but neither the Manchester
Band court nor the Pyramid Lake court did so and both, as noted above, cited Seminole
Nation as settled law.
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consistent manner in which the various funds are either invested or de-
posited in the Treasury have discouraged the tribes from taking legal
action. Consequently, the government has been benefiting from its
special relationship to the Indian tribes by acquiring low interest and
interest-free loans, but has avoided being burdened with duties and
subjected to the remedies which normally inhere in a trust relation-
ship.
The Development of an Equitable Remedy
for Breach of Trust
In order to determine whether his money is being handled cor-
rectly, a beneficiary generally brings a suit for an accounting." If the
account rendered is unsatisfactory or shows mismanagement, a court
may find the trustee liable and fix damages accordingly. If interest in-
come has been lost owing to failure to make money productive, for in-
stance, a court may include the lost interest in its computation of dam-
ages.
57
Accounting claims have comprised one of the major categories of
claims adjudicated by the Indian Claims Commission.58 The commis-
sion proceeds with accounting claims in much the same way as do
courts of equity generally, 59 with any minor refinements largely due
to the size and bureaucratic organization of the federal trustee. For
instance, the commission has placed on the government a heavy burden
to provide a report so detailed "that it may be readily ascertained
whether plaintiffs' funds were properly managed." 0  Furthermore, the
plaintiff is entitled to know whether or not any interest has been lost
through dilatory practices either in depositing funds in the Treasury or
in expending them."
56. See notes 5-12 & accompanying text supra.
57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 207 (1959).
58. The commission was created by the Act of Aug. 13, 1946, ch. 959, 60 Stat.
1049 (codified at 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 70-70v-2 (1963 & Pamphlet No. 1, 1975). Before the
commission was set up, a tribe could not even get into court without petitioning Congress
for an act waiving sovereign immunity, granting jurisdiction to the Court of Claims, and
setting forth both the specific claim that could be made and the relief that could be
granted. Only 142 Indian claims were adjudicated in the 65 year period between the
passage of the first jurisdictional act in 1881 and the passage of the Indian Claims
Commission act. Wilkinson, Indian Tribal Claims Before the Court of Claims, 55 GEO.
L.J. 511, 512 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Wilkinson].
59. See Sioux Tribe v. United States, 12 Ind. Cl. Comm. 541, 547-50 (1963). For
the procedure generally used in suits for accounting see BOGERT, supra note 5, § 970.
60. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. United States, 23 Ind. CI. Comm. 181, 185 (1970);
see BOGERT, supra note 5, § 970, at 199-204.
61. Te-Moak Bands of Western Shoshone Indians v. United States, 23 Ind. Cl.
Comm. 70, 80 (1970).
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Te-Moak: The Commission's Delineation of Trust Obligations
In 1973 the Indian Claims Commission began to make a series
of far-reaching decisions in accounting cases, the first of which was Te-
Moak Bands of Western Shoshone Indians v. United States.6 2  In its
1974 report, the commission described Te-Moak as a landmark deci-
sion because "[a] definitive and final ruling on the questions involved
in this case is a prerequisite to the final disposition of some fifty other
accounting cases.
6 3
Te-Moak is a consolidations of separate accounting claims by the
Western Shoshone Nation and the Mescalero Apache Tribe which
raised the issue of the liability of the government for mismanagemenf
of tribal IMPL funds. From 1883 until 1930, the government kept
the IMPL money of all tribes in one non-interest-bearing account in
the Treasury. This long term interest-free loan was ended in 1930
when Congress enacted 25 U.S.C. section 161b,64 which required
separate accounts to be created for each tribe and which provided for
4 percent simple interest to be paid annually on those accounts having
balances over $500. At that time, the government began paying 4 per-
cent simple interest on the plaintiffs' IMPL funds.65
The commission in Te-Moak reached two significant conclusions:
(1) it held that IMPL funds were express trusts and (2) it decided
to impose liability on the government for not investing the funds for
the period 1883-1930.
The commission's delineation of the government's duties with re-
spect to the trust funds in issue was based completely on statutes: "the
duties of the United States with respect to the Indian tribes' moneys
must be based on written law: the Constitution, treaties, and acts of
Congress. '66 Its holding was anchored on a little used statute passed
in 1841 which provides:
All funds held in trust by the United States, and the annual interest
accruing thereon, when not otherwise required by treaty, shall be
62. 31 Ind. Cl. Comm. 427 (1973), reh. denied, 33 Ind. Cl. Comm. 417 (1974),
rev'd in pertinent part sub nom. United States v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, No. 2-74 (Ct.
CI., July 11, 1975).
63. 1974 IND. CL. COMM'N ANN. REP. 2.
64. Act of June 13, 1930, ch. 483, § 2, 46 Stat. 584, amending Act of Feb. 12,
1929, ch. 178, 45 Stat. 1164 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 161b (1970)).
65. At the same time, the defendants set up funds for the interest payments,
entitled "Interest on Proceeds of Labor, Western Shoshone Indians" and "Interest on
Proceeds of Labor, Mescalero Indians." These accounts earned no interest. The commis-
sion did not rule on these accounts, however, because it held they were not properly in
issue. 31 Ind. Cl. Comm. at 525-26 n.54.
66. Id. at 430.
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invested in stocks of the United States, bearing a rate of interest not
less than 5 per centum per annum.
67
The commission held that the 1841 act, though rarely cited, was still
in effect" and was intended to be a mandate that all trust funds held
by the government be made productive. 69
Its next step was a careful analysis of the 1883 act, the statute
creating the IMPL fund, which states:
The proceeds of all pasturage and sales of timber, coal, or other
product of any Indian reservation . . . and not the result of the
labor of any member of such tribe, shall be covered into the Trea-
sury for the benefit of such tribe under such regulations as the Sec-
retary of the Interior shall prescribe .... 70
In an attempt to impose some duty on the government, the commission
laboriously established that the language of the 1883 act met all the
standards for the creation of an express trust. 71 Therefore, the com-
mission found that the 1841 act applied to the IMPL fund, and that
the government was liable for its failure to invest the fund at 5 percent
until 1930, when 25 U.S.C. section 161b explicitly provided for the
fund to be kept in the Treasury at 4 percent simple interest.
72
In assessing damages, the commission determined that 5 percent
interest compounded annually on the corpus of the fund represented
one portion of the amount of defendant's liability to the plaintiffs-a
portion which became liquidated in 1930 when 25 U.S.C. section 161b
became effective and the fund was divided. Since at the time of the
division of the fund the corpus of the trust was deficient by that same
amount, the commission determined that the defendant was liable for
the resultant shortages in the plaintiffs' respective accounts owing to its
previous failure to invest. To compensate the plaintiffs for the loss of
growth of their respective shares, it ordered that 4 percent simple in-
terest be paid on the shortages.73
67. 31 U.S.C. § 547a (1970) (originally enacted as Act of Sept. 11, 1841, ch. 25,
§ 2, 5 Stat. 465). See note 69 infra.
68. "[A] statute is not repealed by being forgotten, and must be enforced when
rediscovered." 31 Ind. Cl. Comm. at 478, citing District of Columbia v. Thompson Co.,
346 U.S. 100 (1953).
69. It is no wonder the 1841 act has been largely ignored. In 1873, section 2 was
codified in the Revised Statutes in the title concerning public moneys. When the United
States Code was compiled in 1926, section 2 of the act was omitted, although it has never
been repealed. In 1931, section 2 finally appeared in Title 31, Money & Finance, as
section 547a. See 31 Ind. Cl. Comm. at 477-78.
70. Act of March 3, 1883, ch. 141, § 1, 22 Stat. 590 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 155
(1970)).
71. 31 Ind. Cl. Comm. at 489-504.
72. See note 64 supra.
73. 31 Ind. Cl. Comm. at 523-27. The commission's method of calculating
damages is set forth with some specificity here because it was the focus of one of the
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The plaintiffs urged on their motion for rehearing that the com-
mission follow Manchester Band and determine that 25 U.S.C. section
161b set only a guaranteed rate of return and did not allow the govern-
ment to let IMPL funds lie in the Treasury at 4 percent when greater
interest could be earned by other authorized investments. 74  The com-
mission denied this motion, noting that it had no evidence before it that
safe securities yielding more than 4 percent were in existence from
1930 to 1946.75
In subsequent accounting claim decisions the commission has ap-
plied the same two-step process it developed in Te-Moak. It first ex-
amines the instrument creating the fund or account in issue to deter-
mine whether it creates a trust. If it so construes the fund, it applies
the 1841 act as a measure of the government's liability. 6 Since the
statute requires the fund to be invested in government securities yield-
ing 5 percent interest, a tribe can be made whole only by the commis-
sion's assessment of damages at 5 percent of the fund, compounded
annually.
The commission in recent accounting opinions has been cautious,
as befits an administrative tribunal deciding a question of first impres-
sion with the knowledge that its decision will certainly be appealed.
Nevertheless, this caution flaws the opinions. The fact that the deci-
sions have based the government's duties completely on statutes has
enabled the Court of Claims on appeal to reject not only the statutory
construction adopted by the commission, but also any finding of a duty
to make trust funds productive.
Mescalero Apache Tribe: The Court of Claims's Reversal of Te-Moak
An example of the consequences of the commission's approach
is the Court of Claims reversal of Te-Moak.7 7  In reversing the com-
mission's major holding the court completely rejected the statutory
construction which the administrative body had adopted. The ma-
principal objections to the decision successfully raised by the defendants on appeal. See
notes 77-94 & accompanying text infra.
74. Te-Moak Bands of Western Shoshone Indians v. United States, 33 Ind. Cl.
Comm. 417, 425 (1974) (opinion denying motion for rehearing).
75. Id.
76. See, e.g., Fort Peck Indians v. United States, 34 Ind. Cl. Comm. 24, 37-44
(1974) (non-interest-bearing accounts containing yearly interest payments are trust
funds; government liable for failure to invest); Blackfeet & Gros Ventre Tribes v. United
States, 32 Ind. Cl. Comm. 65, 134-39 (1973) (land cession agreement which provided
that unexpended balances of $164,000 annual installments of payment be deposited in
treasury created a trust; government liable for failure to invest).
77. United States v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 518 F.2d 1309 (Ct Cl. 1975),
rev'g in pertinent part Te-Moak Bands of Western Shoshone Indians of Nevada v. United
States, 31 Ind. Cl. Comm. 427 (1973). See note 4 supra.
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jority's reasoning demonstrates the inadequacy and inequity of basing
the government's trust fiduciary duties solely on statutes rather than on
federal common law. Further, the decision serves as a paradigm of
the inappropriateness of the Court of Claims as a forum for Indian
tribes."
The opinion relied on two rules of law. First, the court stated
that the statutory "no interest rule" bars the Court of Claims from
awarding interest against the United States 79 "unless there is a contract
or statute expressly providing for the payment of interest."80  Second,
the court exhumed the doctrine of sovereign immunity, which bars suit
against the government unless the government expressly and unequiv-
ocally waives immunity.8
To the Court of Claims, the commission's award against the gov-
ernment was actually an award of interest masquerading as damages
for lost profits.8" The court concluded that the commission had no
jurisdiction to make such an award in the absence of specific statutes
waiving sovereign immunity and giving the commission the necessary
authority to award interest. The court held that the 1841 act did not
provide the needed authority because "the Act did not require the pay-
ment by the United States of interest on any fund that was not expressly
required to be productive by a contract, treaty, or statute.""3  Since
no other statute expressly provided for payment of interest on IMPL
funds before 1930, the court reasoned, interest could not be awarded
against the government. The court also refused to find a waiver of
sovereign immunity or authorization to award interest in the Indian
Claims Commission Act. 4
Although the court purported to rely on the above two rules of
law, it actually found determinative two facts which should never have
influenced its opinion-the BIA's failure to apply the 1841 act and the
cost to the government of imposing liability. With regard to adminis-
trative interpretation of the 1841 act, the court stated that "no one in
the Executive Department of the Government considered the 1841
statute as authority to invest Indian trust funds, nor as a law requiring
78. See notes 134-44 & accompanying text infra.
79. 518 F.2d at 1314, 1316-21.
80. Id. at 1314-15, citing 28 U.S.C. § 2516(a) (1970).
81. United States v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 518 F.2d at 1314. Chambers, call-
ing the sovereign immunity doctrine "somewhat of a puzzle to all commentators who
have considered it," notes that both the American Bar Association and the Administrative
Conference of the United States have urged its abolition as a separate defense. Cham-
bers, supra note 32, at 1242 & n.131.
82. 518 F.2d at 1322.
83. Id. at 1330.
84. Id. at 1332-33.
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the Government to pay interest on such funds."8' 5  Surely the Indian
tribes will find little solace in the explanation that the BIA's ignoring
of statutes can have the effect of repealing them. Such repeal by im.
plication may provide a ready excuse for the government whenever it
faces charges of liability for bureaucratic ineptitude.
The most shocking aspect of the court's decision, however, is that
it appears to be based primarily on fiscal considerations. The court,
ever willing to take the government at its word, stated, "the ultimate
cost to the Government could be an astronomical amount. The Gov-
ernment estimates it could amount to billions of dollars. '86 Although
the court was quick to state that such concerns did "not govern the out-
come of this suit,"87 clearly they did.
Judge Davis's dissenting opinion stressed the "plain words" of the
1841 act,88 the folly of relying on inconsistent administrative interpreta-
tion of a statute,8 9 and the completeness of the legislative history of
the 1841 and 1880 acts.90 In addition, Judge Davis would have found
jurisdiction in that part of the Indian Claims Commission Act which
established a new cause of action for "claims based upon fair and
honorable dealings that are not recognized by any existing rule of law
or equity."'" This section of the Indian Claims Commission Act
should have allowed the commission to apply standard trust law to the
government, according to the dissent.92
Manchester Band-A District Court's Approach
Even Judge Davis's analysis would not allow for the finding of an
equitable right to enforce general trust duties against the government
85. Id. at 1325.
86. Id. at 1333. The government's estimates are not necessarily reliable. The ma-
jority earlier quoted at length from a 1926 Supreme Court opinion and emphasized the
following language: "It would require compound interest [on $1,111,284.70] brought
about by annual or semi-annual rests for near a century, an amount the Solicitor General
suggests would be equal to the National Debt." Id. at 28, quoting Cherokee Nation v.
United States, 270 U.S. 476, 492 (1926) (emphasis omitted). Commissioner Blue, who
authored Te-Moak, pointed out: "The Solicitor General mislead the court. The national
debt in 1926 was $19,643,216,000. Five percent interest on $1,111,284.70 compounded
annually for 88 years would amount to $80,262,338, or about four-tenths of one percent
of the 1926 national debt." 31 Ind. Cl. Comm. at 530.
87. 518 F.2d at 1333.
88. Id. at 1335.
89. Id. at 1335-36.
90. Id. at 1336.
91. Id. at 1340, quoting 25 U.S.C. § 70a(5). See also Note, Indians-Extent of
the "Fair and Honorable Dealings" Section of the Indian Claims Commission Act, 15 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 491 (1971), a case note on Gila River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community
v. United States, 427 F.2d 1194 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 819 (1970).
92. 518 F.2d at 1340-41.
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in the absence of the "fair and honorable dealings" section of the In-
dian Claims Commission Act.93  The court in Manchester Band of
Pono Indians, Inc. v. United States,94 relied on federal common law
as well as statutory law and as a result had no difficulty in imposing
liability on the United States.
The Manchester Band of Pomo Indians, which occupies a small
rancheria in Northern California, was incorporated in 1938 under the
Indian Reorganization Act.95 The government had charge of three
types of accounts for the band: an Indian money (JIM) account, main-
tained at the Sacramento Area Office of the BIA; an account in the
United States Treasury; and accounts in various commercial banks.
The IIM account contained revenues from a dairy farm which the
band had operated from 1938 until 1956. Although the band de-
manded an accounting for the entire period during which the account
was maintained, the defendants furnished it with only a partial account-
ing. Together with the plaintiffs own inspection of the band's ledgers
in the BIA Sacramento Office, this partial accounting showed that al-
though the band had unobligated balances in this account ranging from
a high of $10,000 in 1946 to a low of $100 in 1956, only two payments
of interest, totalling $26.31,96 had ever been made. The average un-
obligated balance in the account was $7,500, and from 1957 on the
account showed a balance of approximately $3,500. No interest had
been paid on this account from 1947 until 1965.11
In 1963, the band had begun to lease portions of its trust land.
Proceeds from the leases had been deposited in the Treasury at 4 per-
cent simple interest per annum.98 Two payments had been credited
late to the band's Treasury account. One of these payments, deposited
ten months late, had not been credited with any interest. In 1966,
93. Id. at 1340. In an earlier case, Judge Davis stated that the Court of Claims has
jurisdiction to review discretionary acts of BIA officials when claim is made that they
have breached fiduciary duties. Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes of Indians of Oklahoma v.
United States, 512 F.2d 1390, 1392 (Ct. Cl. 1975). Cheyenne-Arapaho is, however,
doubtful authority for any proposition. See note 145 infra.
94. 363 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
95. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of June 18, 1934, ch.
576, § 1, 48 Stat. 984). The act was intended to give tribes more autonomy. An
incorporated tribe is eligible, for instance, to receive loans and other benefits from the
government. See UNITED STATES SOLICITOR, DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, FEDERAL INDIAN
LAw 479-81 (1966).
96. $15.31 in June, 1947 and $11.00 in July, 1947. 363 F. Supp. at 1242.
97. Id. at 1247. (From the closing of the dairy farm until 1963, the band's only
source of income was the proceeds from the farm.)
98. Although they are not IMPL funds, revenues from leases are treated in the
same way as IMPL funds upon deposit in the Treasury. Compare 25 U.S.C. § 161a
(1970) with 25 U.S.C. § 161b (1970). For regulations governing leasing of tribal lands
see 25 C.F.R. §§ 131.1-.20 (1975).
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some of the annual interest earned on the band's Treasury account had
been withdrawn and deposited in commercial banks at prevailing rates
of interest.99
On the basis of the above uncontroverted facts, United States Dis-
trict Court Judge Charles B. Renfrew had little difficulty in characteriz-
ing the government's management of the band's money as deficient.
Furthermore, the court found it necessary to apply sanctions 00 as a re-
sult of the government's failure to comply with the court's discovery
orders.' Among fourteen facts found to be true in its sanction order,
the court ruled that the defendants had borrowed the band's funds at
a lower rate of interest than they could on the open market and that
they had failed to show they had ever managed the band's money
wisely.
10 2
In setting forth the statutory range of permissible investments for
tribal funds, the court considered in the main the same statutes on
which the commission had relied in Te-Moak. There were, however,
two essential differences: (1) because income from leasing, and not
IMPL funds, was in issue, the court discussed 25 U.S.C. section 161a l s
rather than 25 U.S.C. section 161b; and (2) the court considered other
statutes governing all government-managed funds.
Judge Renfrew did not find it necessary to base his opinion on
the seldom used 1841 act,' 0 4 for to him all the statutes governing in-
vestments were examined as alternatives from which the government
in its role as a reasonably prudent trustee was obligated to choose the
wisest legal investments for its tribal beneficiary's funds. Echoing the
words used by the court of claims in Menominee Tribe,0 5 he stated:
The Secretary of the Interior is under a duty to act pursuant to the
Government's fiduciary obligations, and he is not prevented from
doing so by the statutes which authorize various investments for
Indian trust funds.' 0 6
The court began with the proposition that at the very least the
defendants obligated themselves to pay 4 percent simple interest per
annum on funds which are or can be held in the Treasury:
99. 363 F. Supp. at 1242.
100. SeeFED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2) (A).
101. Over two years elapsed after the interrogatories were propounded, and despite
orders to compel and an order to show cause, the defendants were unable to give the
court an adequate explanation for their delay. 363 F. Supp. at 1241.
102. See 363 F. Supp. at 1250-52.
103. Act of June 13, 1930, ch. 483, § 1, 46 Stat. 584, amending 25 U.S.C. § 161a
(1970) (originally enacted as Act of Feb. 12, 1929, ch. 178, § 1, 45 Stat. 1164). Both
section 161a and section 161b require that 4% simple interest be paid on tribal Treasury
accounts having balances over $500.
104. See notes 67-69 & accompanying text supra.
105. Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 101 Ct. Cl. 10, 21 (1944).
106. 363 F. Supp. at 1247.
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[Section] 161a did not set a ceiling of 4 per cent interest, but
rather a floor, or guaranteed return, of at least 4 per cent when
there were no other investments which paid a higher rate of re-
turn which a reasonably prudent trustee would be authorized to
make.10
7
When higher returns are available, Judge Renfrew noted, 25 U.S.C.
section 162a,10  gives the Secretary of the Interior discretion to deposit
both community and individual funds in banks, public debt obligations
of the United States, or "bonds, notes or other obligations which are
unconditionally guaranteed as to both principal and interest by the
United States." 109
The court recognized further that Congress has provided that all
government-managed trust funds may be invested in such agency bonds
and obligations as those issued by the Tennessee Valley Authority,
110
the Federal Home Loan Banks,' Commodity Credit Corporation,112
and the Federal National Mortgage Association.1 '  Not all of these
debentures are unconditionally guaranteed by the United States as to
both principal and interest, as 25 U.S.C. section 162a requires; how-
ever, because the cited investments are lawful for all Government-
managed trust funds, of which Indian funds are a smaller class, the stat-
utes authorizing purchase of these obligations necessarily enlarge the
discretion given the secretary under section 162a."1 4 This conclusion
was also reached by an associate solicitor in the Department of the In-
terior in a memorandum quoted in the opinion." 5
Moreover, the court found that the applicable federal statutes
merely define the scope of the Government's obligations; the manner
107. Id. at 1244.
108. 25 U.S.C. § 162a (1970) (originally enacted as Act of June 24, 1938, ch. 648,
§ 1, 52 Stat. 1037).
109. 363 F. Supp. at 1244, citing 25 U.S.C. § 162a (1970). For regulations
governing such deposits see 25 C.F.R. §§ 105.1-.17 (1975). Section 105.1 specifies
"individual or tribal" funds. Section 105.9 provides that the bank accounts shall be
opened in the name of the disbursing agent. It appears that it is by this process that ILM
funds are mixed with tribal funds. It is but another indication of the confusion which
often appears to reign in the BIA that section 105.1 of the regulations gives as authority
for deposit of individual and tribal funds 25 U.S.C. section 162, which was repealed in
1938 by 25 U.S.C. section 162a. See 25 C.F.R. § 105.1 (1975).
110. 16 U.S.C. §§ 831n-4(d) (1970).
111. 12 U.S.C. § 1435 (1970).
112. 15 U.S.C. § 713a-4(1970).
113. 12 U.S.C. § 1723c (1970).
114. 363 F. Supp. at 1244-45.
115. Id. at 1244, quoting Associate Solicitor for Indian Affairs, Dep't of the
Interior, MEMORANDUM TO THE COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS (May
3, 1968). The memorandum stated that 12 U.S.C. § 1723c "constitutes a grant of
additional authority to permit the investment of tribal trust funds . . . in FNMA
participation certificates guaranteed by the United States and other FNMA obligations
which are not so guaranteed."
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in which these obligations are to be carried out is governed by trust
principles. To the court it is "unquestioned that the United States has
a solemn trust obligation to the Indian people."" 16 It is also unques-
tioned that "conduct of the Government as a trustee is measured by
the same standards applicable to private trustees.""'
Measuring the government's management of the band's funds by
private trust law standards, the court found that the government had
breached both its duty of loyalty to the fiduciary and its duty to make
the trust property productive. It therefore held the government liable
for profits made from maladministration of the funds. Further, the
court implied that the government ought to be held to a higher than
average standard of care since it has a greater degree of skill than the
ordinary investor.
The district court's approach is preferable to that of the commis-
sion because application of private trust law principles to the govern-
ment provides the maximum investment flexibility."18  To treat the
government as a private trustee is essentially to apply business stand-
ards, rather than lofty but ineffectual paternalistic criteria, to the rela-
tionship between tribes and the government. Such a business relation-
ship could ensure the tribal officers a measure of control over invest-
ment policies. A tribe could elect, for instance, to keep some of its
funds in a local bank which did not pay the highest rate of interest in
order to encourage that bank to make loans to tribal members. Such
flexibility would work to the advantage of both the powerful and or-
ganized tribes, which take a great interest in making sophisticated in-
vestments, and small tribes, such as the Manchester Pomos, which are
often too busy trying to maintain what little land and identity they have
to get significantly involved with investment of their funds.
Presently, over six million dollars in IMPL funds belonging to
both large and small tribes is still kept in the Treasury at low rates of
interest." 9 Even when funds are taken out of the Treasury and in-
vested, investment practices vary greatly not only from tribe to tribe,
but also from fund to fund within a particular tribe. Judge Renfrew
took note of this proliferation of separate funds within one tribe and
pointed out that in certain situations separate funds could be com-
mingled to provide a greater rate of return. 120 Commingling these
116. 363 F. Supp. at 1243.
117. Id. at 1245, citing United States v. Mason, 412 U.S. 391, 398 (1973).
118. The BIA since Manchester Band has instituted monthly accountings to the
tribes. See Manchester Band of Pomo Indians, Inc. v. United States, Civil No. 50276
(N.D. Cal., filed Feb. 28, 1974) (judgment on accounting duties).
119. UNITED STATES TREASURY DEP'T, COMBINED STATEMENT OF RECEIPTS, Ex-
PENDITURES & BALANCES OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FOR THE FISCAL YEAR
ENDED JUNE 30, 1973, at 337.
120. 363 F. Supp. at 1248 n.3.
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small funds is an excellent idea. The rationale behind the requirement
that trust funds be separated is that the beneficiary will be protected
if trustee accountability is ensured. It therefore seems completely ar-
bitrary that simply because one tribe's accounts have different names
and arise under different statutes and treaties they should be separated
rather than combined to increase their earning power.
It is Judge Renfrew's straightforward application of trust law to
the government which makes Manchester Band unique and charac-
terizes it as the better reasoned of the recent decisions on fiduciary
duties of the government toward Indian tribes. Although the Court
of Claims and the Indian Claims Commission have consulted trust trea-
tises and the Restatement of Trusts to a limited extent, no court has
achieved as harmonious an interpretation of the federal common law
of trusts and congressional intent, and as reasonable an application of
common sense, as has the Manchester court.
121
The District Court-A Better Forum
Although there are sound reasons for providing a forum to adjudi-
cate legal problems which are unique to the Indian tribes, such as the
interpretation of treaties, these considerations do not apply to the de-
termination of fiduciary duties. Neither the Indian Claims Commis-
sion nor the Court of Claims has been a satisfactory forum for enforc-
ing such obligations.
The Indian Claims Commission
The Indian Claims Commission has jurisdiction over five broad
types of claims accruing before August 13, 1946,122 and including legal
121. In a recent decision, the Court of Claims apparently adopted a statutory
scheme very similar to that set forth in Manchester Band, which it cited with approval.
Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes of Indians v. United States, 512 F.2d 1390 (Ct. Cl. 1975).
Cheyenne-Arapaho was filed in the Court of Claims and was designed as a test case on
the issue of the government's liability for mismanagement of trust funds. Id. at 1391-92.
Cheyenne-Arapaho is doubtful authority for several reasons. First, the court found the
case inappropriate for summary judgment and returned it to the trial division with
instructions for the trial division to consider certain facts uncontroverted. Id. at 1395.
See generally Or. CL. R. 101(a)-(h). These facts included the statutory scope of
permissible investments and the government's liability for failure to invest the test
plaintiffs' interest accounts. 512 F.2d at 1393-96. Second, Mescalero Apache Tribe,
which reversed Te-Moak, casts considerable doubt on Cheyenne-Arapaho's statutory
scheme, because the scheme relied on the 1841 act. In addition, Cheyenne-Arapaho
indicated that the measure of damages should be the lost profits on the uninvested
interest accounts. Id. at 1396. If the trial division were to apply this measure of damages
on remand, the majority in Mescalero Apache Tribe would surely characterize the
damages as an illegal award of interest against the government. (Judge Davis, who wrote
the majority in Cheyenne-Arapaho, authored the dissent in Mescalero Apache Tribe.)
122. The commission recently ruled that when a wrongful action was going on at
that date it has jurisdiction to order particular accounts carried forward in order to assess
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and equitable tort and contract claims. 123 There are three major prob-
lems, however, in litigating accounting claims before the commis-
sion.' 24  First, the commission has construed its broad jurisdictional
mandate too narrowly; 125 second, it enforces its procedural rules too
strictly; 120 and third, it moves too slowly in settling claims. "' This last
problem is particularly grave. Te-Moak, for instance, presumably
filed before 1951, the jurisdictional cut-off date, was not decided by the
commission until 1973. The Court of Claims did not deliver its opinion
until 1975, and certiorari review by the Supreme Court would result in
further delay. 28 The commission not only divided the original 370
claims into 611 dockets,'2 9 but also decided to adjudicate the dockets
in separate liability and damages proceedings. Moreover, it commonly
allows interlocutory appeals to the Court of Claims from even the most
minor rulings.
In accounting claims, the major cause of delay is the government's
reluctance to render clear accounts. The General Accounting Office
(GAO) reports which serve as the government's accounts are often so
sketchy as to defy attempts at clarification. 30 This problem is exacer-
the entire damage. Blackfeet & Gros Ventre Tribes v. United States, 32 Ind. Cl. Comm.
65, 71-76 (1973). It subsequently applied that rule by ordering the government to bring
up to date a certain non-interest-bearing account. Fort Peck Indians v. United States, 34
Ind. CI. Comm. 24, 34-37 (1974).
123. 25 U.S.C. § 70a (1970). Section 70k of this title required all claims to be
presented by 1951. During that period 370 claims were filed. 1974 IND. CL. COMM'N
ANN. REP. 2.
124. For a general discussion of the history of the commission and a criticism of its
handling of all types of Indian claims see DELORIA, supra note 38, at 207-28.
125. See Wilkinson, supra note 58, at 519. See generally Note, Indians-Extent of
the "Fair and Honorable Dealings" Section of the Indian Claims Commission Act, 15 ST.
Louis U.LJ. 491 (1971).
126. See Te-Moak Bands of Western Shoshone Indians v. United States, 33 Ind. Cl.
Comm. 417, 419 (1974) (opinion denying-motion for rehearing).
127. Originally, the commission was to have concluded its work by 1956. Act of
Aug. 13, 1946, ch. 959, § 23, 60 Stat. 1049. It has been granted four extensions, the
latest of which provides for dissolution by 1977. See 1972 IND. CL. ComM'N ANN. RuP.
5. At the time of the commission's most recent report to Congress, 186 dockets were still
pending, of which 70 were before the Court of Claims on appeal. 1974 IND. CL. COMM'N
ANN. REP. 4.
128. See 25 U.S.C. § 70s (1970).
129. 1974 IND. CL. CoMM'N ANN. RFP. 2.
130. See Blackfeet & Gros Ventre Tribes v. United States, 32 Ind. Cl. Comm. 65
(1973). The tribe had asked for an accounting of trust funds and land resources,
specifically oil and gas resources. The GAO responded with a report which simply stated
a lump sum, $857,442.20, and which indicated that the sum had been deposited to three
Blackfeet IMPL accounts. Since the deposits were not annualized, the commission could
determine neither what portion of the above sum had been deposited to which account,
nor when the money was collected and deposited. The tribes were therefore forced to
come up with their own information by sorting through reports in files which the United
November 1975]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
bated by the government's outright lack of compliance with the com-
mission's orders to supplement the deficient accounts.' In a recent
accounting claim'3 2 the commission pointed out that of six orders to
supplement in the previous seven years, the government had complied
with only one, Te-Moak. An entire section of the opinion was devoted
to a discussion of delays in accounting cases. The Commission specu-
lated that "[i]f the Government's failure to comply with our orders
in accounting cases were deliberately adopted as a defense tactic it
would indeed be an effective one." 33
The Court of Claims
The Court of Claims serves both as the appellate court for the In-
dian Claims Commission' 34 and as a court of original 35 jurisdiction
over tribal claims arising after August 13, 1946.136 Today, therefore,
a tribe wishing to charge the government with a breach of fiduciary
duty would most probably bring suit in the Court of Claims.
The Court of Claims, however, is hardly the most convenient
forum: like the Supreme Court its jurisdiction is nation wide, and a
tribe must engage attorneys in Washington skilled in litigating in that
court.' 37  Further, the Court of Claims hampers its claimants with pro-
cedural rules which are narrower than those in the district court.
138
States Geological Survey had prepared on reservation mining operations. The result of
the plaintiffs' effort was an exhibit which showed that while over twelve million cubic
feet of natural gas was extracted during 1944, only $78.84 in royalties was paid, and in
1945, for ten million cubic feet, no royalties were paid. 32 Ind. Cl. Comm. at 78-80. The
commission's response to this rather startling information was "[t]o say the least,
plaintiffs' exhibit 118 raises extremely serious questions about the adequacy of defend-
ant's accounting." Id. at 80.
131. Compare 1974 IND. CL. COMM'N ANN. REP. 4 with 1972 IND. CL. COMM'N
ANN. REP. 2-3.
132. Blackfeet & Gros Ventre Tribes v. United States, 32 Ind. C1. Comm. 65, 143-
44 (1973).
133. Id. at 146.
134. 25 U.S.C. § 70s (1970).
135. See note 146 infra. See generally C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
FEDERAL COURTS § 11 (2d ed. 1970).
136. Act of Aug. 13, 1946, ch. 959, § 24, 60 Stat. 1049 as amended 28 U.S.C. §
1505 (1970). The Supreme Court may exercise certiorari to review Court of Claims
decisions. 28 U.S.C. § 1255 (1970).
137. Lawyers' fees in the Court of Claims can be considerably higher than the 10%
maximum allowable in the Indian Claims Commission. One writer advances the opinion
that the attorneys who lobbied for the passage of the act wanted to keep secure their
more lucrative practice before the Court of Claims and consequently suggested the 1951
jurisdictional cutoff date. DELORIA, supra note 38, at 226.
138. Compare CT. CL. R. 71-92 with FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37. See Evans, Current
Procedures in the Court of Claims, 55 GEo. L.J. 422 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
Evans]. Although the court's rules were revised in 1969, Commissioner Evans' insights
are still valuable.
[Vol. 27
INDIAN TRIBAL TRUST FUNDS
For instance, leave of the court is required, upon a showing of good
cause, for all discovery except written interrogatories; 139 although sanc-
tions are available for recalcitrant government lawyers, 4 ° they are
rarely imposed.: 4' As a pro-government forum the court has also
been unduly influenced by fiscal considerations' 4' and arguments based
on administrative convenience.' 43 Finally, the claim of executive privi-
lege is easily made in the court. A head of a department called to
produce documents can merely refuse to produce them "when, in his
opinion, compliance will be injurious to the public interest."'
44
The District Court
Claims which primarily involve equitable remedies are peculiarly
suited to a court of general jurisdiction, especially since the Court of
Claims has jurisdiction only to award damages and is prevented from
awarding specific relief.' 45  The district court has more liberal dis-
covery rules, is readily accessible to the tribes' own lawyers (whether
reservation or nearby legal services lawyers), and has expertise in
handling complex claims which involve both legal and equitable reme-
dies. Consequently, a tribe may well prefer to have the option to bring
a suit for accounting of tribal funds in the district court.
Manchester Band was brought under the Tucker Act, which gives
the district court concurrent jurisdiction with the court of claims, but
which limits recoverable damages to $10,000.14 A tribe could, how-
ever, bring an action for an accounting and breach of fiduciary duty
in such a posture as to invoke the district court's federal question juris-
diction, 47 and thus to avoid the jurisdictional damage limit imposed by
139. See C. CL. R. 71(a).
140. See, e.g., Cr. CL. R. 76. Note that a party must have wilfully failed to obey an
order to respond before the court can impose sanctions. CT. CL. R. 76(b).
141. Evans, supra note 138, at 439-40.
142. See Te-Moak Bands of Western Shoshone Indians v. United States, 31 Ind. Cl.
Comm. 427, 529-30 (1973); Wilkinson, supra note 58, at 524-28. See note 86 supra.
143. See text accompanying note 85 supra.
144. CT. CL. R. 75(b) (calls for production of documents). For the rationale
behind this rule, see Evans, supra note 138, at 428-35.
145. See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 557 (1962).
146. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a),(d), 1491 (1970). Section 1346(a) (2) gives the district
court jurisdiction over "[a]ny other civil action or claim against the United States, not
exceeding $10,000 in amount, founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of
Congress, or any regulation of an executive-department, or upon any express or implied
contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not
sounding in tort."
147. A tribe would argue as follows: The scope of the government's trust relation-
ship toward Indian tribes is a matter of federal common law. United States v. Mason,
412 U.S. 391, 397 n.9 (1973); Manchester Band of Pomo Indians, Inc. v. United States,
363 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D. Cal. 1973). Consequently, a suit raising questions about the
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the Tucker Act. Judge Renfrew in Manchester Band indicated the
way to such a posture by finding jurisdiction not only in the Tucker
Act, but also in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),l4 8 in the
Mandamus Act,149 and in 28 U.S.C. section 1362, which gives the dis-
trict courts original jurisdiction over all civil actions brought by incorpo-
rated tribes in which a federal question is involved. Indeed, the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act has frequently served as a vehicle for tribes
to challenge decisions of the Secretary of the Interior, 150 and incorpo-
rated tribes have also been successful in basing district court jurisdic-
tion on the grant of federal question jurisdiction contained in 28 U.S.C.
section 1362.151
Conclusion
Manchester Band of Pomo Indians, Inc. v. United States5 2 and
Te-Moak Bands of Western Shoshone Indians v. United States,153 two
recent challenges to federal mismanagement of tribal funds, indicate
that the judiciary may finally be ready to deal squarely with an ethical
question of some magnitude-how the United States government can
government's management of trust funds would arise under the law of the United States
and would raise a federal question. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970). Indian tribes may bring
such a suit in district court regardless of the amount in controversy. 28 U.S.C. § 1361
(1970).
148. 5 U.S.C. §H 701-06 (1970). The APA provides for judicial review of agency
action which is unreasonably delayed, arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise contrary to law.
149. 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1970).
150. See, e.g., Tooahnippah v. Hickel, 397 U.S. 598 (1970) (allowed review of
decision of regional solicitor of the Department of the Interior disapproving a will);
Rockbridge v. Lincoln, 449 F.2d 567, 573 (9th Cir. 1971) (APA and Mandamus Act
held to grant jurisdiction to district court to compel agency action wrongfully withheld);
Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252, 258 (D.D.C. 1972)
(regulation issued by Secretary of the Interior declared to be contrary to law.) The
existence of a remedy under the Tucker Act should not preclude a tribe from seeking
other relief. National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 455 F.2d 650, 654 (10th Cir. 1971) (the
Court of Claims remedy held not to be preemptive merely because it sounds in contract)
(jurisdiction asserted under the APA and the National Environmental Policy Act). But
cf. Warner v. Cox, 487 F.2d 1301, 1306 (5th Cir. 1974) (APA invoked by contractor to
circumvent the Court of Claims). In Warner, no jurisdictional basis other than the APA
could be relied on and none of the substantive claims concerned anything but the
payment of money. The action was obviously an action against the United States in the
form of an action against its ministers.
151. See, e.g., Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661 (1974)
(intent of section 1362 was to remove the $10,000 jurisdictional barrier).
152. 363 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
153. 31 Ind. Cl. Comm. 427 (1973) reh. denied, 33 Ind. Cl. Comm. 417 (1974),
rev'd in pertinent part sub nom. United States v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 518 F.2d 1309
(Ct. Cl. 1975).
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call itself the trustee for Indian tribes and yet hold large amounts of
tribal money in its treasury at very little interest or at no interest at all.
The problem is compounded by the fact that even when funds are in-
vested, investment practices vary considerably.
That the existence of a trust relationship between the Indian tribes
and the government has rarely been interpreted to carry with it the
obligation of the trustee to manage wisely the property and money of
those tribes is one of the many arcana of Indian law. For years the
poorest ethnic group in the United States, the Indian tribes can ill af-
ford to be the beneficiaries of a trust relationship in which the trustee
is not held strictly accountable for fiscal mismanagement.
Nell Jessup Newton*
* Member, Third Year Class.
